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Workers' Compensation-Retaliatory Discharge---The
Legislative Response to Dockery v. Lampart Table Co.
North Carolina adopted its Workers' Compensation Act1 in 1929
for the purposes of providing swift and certain medical and wage-re-
placement benefits to injured workers and ensuring limited liability for
employers.2 The social goal behind a worker's compensation system is
compensating victims of employment-related injuries in an efficient
and dignified manner and allocating these costs ultimately to the con-
sumers of products.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated
that the primary purpose of worker's compensation legislation is "to
compel industry to take care of its own wreckage,"4 and has often held
that the Act is to be construed liberally for the benefit of injured em-
ployees.5
Despite the clear and consistent articulation of these policies
favoring compensation, North Carolina shares with much of the nation
a persistent problem in administering its compensation system. Un-
scrupulous employers have commonly avoided their statutory obliga-
tions by threatening to fire employees who file compensation claims
following injury. Such a threat forces an employee to choose either to
bear the full cost of the injury, in direct conflict with the statutory man-
date, or to lose his or her job. If the threat is successful, the employer
avoids the higher insurance premiums that result from compensation
claims; if the threat is unsuccessful and the injured employee is fired,
an example is set for the remaining employees. That the practice is not
new is demonstrated by cases over the past three decades brought by
employees alleging discharges in retaliation for pursuit of workers'
compensation6 and by the enactment of several state statutes outlawing
1. Law of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979)).
2. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966). Under a
workers' compensation system, the employee is deprived of common law rights and remedies for
employment-related injuries in exchange for certainty of compensatory payments. Hicks v.
Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966); Lee v. American Enka Corp., 212 N.C.
455, 193 S.E. 809 (1937).
3. See I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20 (1978); Vause v. Vause Farm
Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951).
4. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
5. Thomas v. Raleigh Gas Co., 218 N.C. 429, 433, 11 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1940); Johnson v.
Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930); Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 17 N.C.
App. 598, 603, 195 S.E.2d 371, 376, rev'don other grounds, 284 N.C. 230, 200 S.E.2d 193 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 129 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Christy v. Petrus, 365
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the practice.7 The Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission has reported that the practice of retaliatory discharge is wide-
spread in North Carolina,' and attorneys familiar with worker's
compensation agree with that assessment.' In 1978, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals first addressed the problem and held that an injured
employee has no legal protection against being fired for pursuing work-
ers' compensation benefits.' 0 Shortly thereafter, the North Carolina
General Assembly responded to the court's decision by amending the
Workers' Compensation Act to create a claim for relief for employees
who are fired for pursuing workers' compensation benefits."
In Dockery v. Lampart Table Co.,2 plaintiff Dockery received
neck and back injuries when a load of tables fell on him while working
at defendant's furniture factory. 3 He filed for and received temporary
disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.' 4 After two
months of recuperation, he returned to work but was soon fired without
being given a reason. 5 Dockery brought an action against his em-
ployer, alleging that his discharge was in retaliation for pursuit of his
remedies under the Act and was an attempt to discourage his pursuing
those remedies.' 6 Therefore, Dockery argued, the discharge both un-
dermined the policy of the Act and violated G.S. 97-6, which prohibits
the use by an employer of any "device" to relieve the employer of its
Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Raley v. Darling Shop of Greeneville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59
S.E.2d 148 (1950).
7. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1979); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-32 (1976); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 5 (West Supp. 1979); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1979); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1979).
8. Statement by William H. Stephenson, Chairman of N.C. Industrial Commission, to
North Carolina House Committee considering H.B. 568 (now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-
6.1, 1-55(3) (1979 & Supp. 1979)); see Charlotte Observer, May 21, 1979, at 1.
9. Telephone conversations with attorneys Charles Cromer of High Point, Judith Kincaid of
Raleigh and Al Adams of Raleigh (Oct. 3, 1979).
A survey of insurance executives, union officials, and workers' compensation attorneys in
Texas indicated that retaliatory discharge is also common in that state. 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 387,
388-90 (1973).
10. Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cerl. denied, 295 N.C.
465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
11. Law of June 1, 1979, ch. 738, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 806 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
97-6.1, 1-55(3) (1979) & Supp. 1979)), quoted at note 60 infra.
12. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
13. Id. at 294, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 295, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
16. Id.
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obligations under the Act.'7 In addition, he argued that the discharge
constituted a tort actionable independently of the statute.' 8
Unable to cite North Carolina precedent recognizing a tort of re-
taliatory discharge, Dockery relied heavily on the leading case of
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. 19 In Frampton, the Indiana
Supreme Court recognized a claim for relief based upon plaintiff's alle-
gation that she had been fired for filing a workers' compensation claim
after being injured on the job. This result was based in part upon a
provision of the Indiana workers' compensation statute that prohibits
an employer's use of a device to avoid its obligations under the statute
in terms substantially identical to the North Carolina Act."° The court
reasoned that under the statute employers have a duty to compensate
employees for work-related injuries and employees have a right to
compensation. The goals of the system would be defeated if employers
were permitted to penalize employees for filing compensation claims
because the fear of being discharged would have a "deleterious ef-
fect" 2' on the employee's exercise of his or her statutory rights, result-
ing in the employer being "effectively relieved of his obligation."22
Discharge or threat of discharge was thus held to be a "device" prohib-
ited by the statute.23 The court went further to hold that such a dis-
charge was an intentional, wrongful act actionable in tort.24 Because
the Frampton court was concerned with the employer's motive and the
coercive effect upon employees, who would choose to bear the full cost
of job-related injuries rather than suffer discharge, it found that plain-
tiff's receipt of statutory compensation did not affect her tort action.25
The Dockery court, in upholding the dismissal of the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected
the Frampton reasoning and refused to find a common-law right of
17. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6 (1979) provides that "[n]o contract or agreement, written or
implied, no rule, regulation, or other device shall in any manner operate to relieve an employer, in
whole or in part, of any obligation created by this Article, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided."
18. 36 N.C. App. at 295, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
19. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
20. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28; see IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Bums 1974).
21. 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
22. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
23. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427. Other state courts have accepted the Frampton reasoning.
See Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977); Sventko v. Kroger
Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). But see Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d
1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977).
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action for retaliatory discharge.26 According to the court, plaintiff's
rights were determined by the common-law rule that employment con-
tracts of indefinite duration may be terminated at the will of either
party, with or without cause,27 unless a statute provides otherwise. The
court then found no right to relief conferred by statute, refusing to de-
fine "device" as used in G.S. 97-6 to include this single act of retalia-
tory discharge.28 Further, the court inferred from the statute's failure
to provide civil liability for retaliatory discharge a legislative intent that
no such claim for relief be created.29
26. 36 N.C. App. at 296, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
27. Id. at 297, 244 S.E.2d at 275. The terminable at will rule developed in the late nineteenth
century as a presumption to be used injudicial interpretation of employment contracts of unspeci-
fied duration. The rule soon froze into a rule of law and has often been responsible for harsh
results. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1908) (96 black steve-
dores hired for permanent positions discharged to mike room for white stevedores); Lewis v.
Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 240 Iowa 1249, 37 N.W.2d 316 (1949) (company's best salesman
dismissed without notice or cause despite promise of lifetime employment in return for remaining
with company). See generally Note, 15 N.C.L. REV. 276 (1937). The rule contributed to the
employer's freedom of enterprise by permitting discharge of employees without judicial examina-
tion of the employer's motive and without enforcement of any equity theories of contractual fair-
ness. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at WillRule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976); Note, A Common Law Actionfor the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINos L.J.
1435, 1438-40 (1975); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 335, 341-45
(1974).
28. 36 N.C. App. at 298, 244 S.E.2d at 276.
29. Id. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the United States
Supreme Court delineated the factors relevant to a consideration of whether an implied cause of
action should be recognized. These include: (1) whether plaintiff is one of the class for whose
special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there i4 any indication of legislative intent to
create or deny a remedy; and (3) whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the statutory scheme. Id. at 78. Although the Dockery court held there was no actual
violation of the statute because plaintiff received his compensation benefits, the Cori analysis pro-
vides the basis for an argument that an implied statutory cause of action should have been recog-
nized. Plaintiff is one of the class benefited by the workers' compensation scheme, and it is
consistent with the scheme to protect the exercise of statutory rights from the threat of job loss.
See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); text accom-
panying notes 19-25 supra.
Plaintiff in Dockery, however, relied on a tort as well as a statutory cause of action. An
example of a tort action for wrongful discharge, as distinguished from an action implied from the
terms of a statute, appears in Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). In
Harless, plaintiff was discharged for attempting to bring defendant, his employer, into compliance
with state and federal consumer credit protection laws. The consumer credit statutes in question
did not create a cause of action upon which he could rely, but the court recognized a tort action
for discharge based on contravention of substantial public policy. Id. at 275 & n.5. Comment-
ing upon the relationship between the policies established by statute and plaintiff's tort action, the
court stated:
We have no hesitation in stating that the Legislature intended to establish a clear
and unequivocal policy that consumers of credit covered by the Act were to be given
protection. Such manifest public policy should not be frustrated by a holding that an
employee of a lending institution covered by the Act, who seeks to ensure that compli-
ance is being made with the Act, can be discharged without being furnished a cause of
action for such discharge.
Id. at 276. In Dockery, plaintiff relied on this same principle.
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The terminable at will rule of employment contracts has func-
tioned in North Carolina primarily as a canon of contract construction,
used by the courts when presented with a discharged employee who
asserts a contractual right to continuing employment.3" Ordinarily the
rule operates as a presumption, providing that the employment rela-
tionship will be considered terminable at will unless plaintiff can prove
a contract for a definite term.3 Prior to Dockery, the rule had been
relied upon in North Carolina in only two tort actions for wrongful
discharge, as opposed to actions based upon alleged employment con-
tracts. In both Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 32 and May v. Tidewa-
ter Power Co., plaintiffs alleged that they were summarily and
maliciously discharged without cause and that they suffered humilia-
tion due to subsequent public knowledge of the events.34 The court in
each case held that a tort action for wrongful discharge can succeed
only if the discharge is accompanied by an independently actionable
tort,35 because, while the discharge itself is not actionable, the termina-
ble at will rule does not alter the duties of conduct imposed upon the
parties by tort law.36
The Dockery court did not undertake the analysis suggested in
30. The rule was adopted in North Carolina in Edwards v. Seaboard & Roanoke R.R., 121
N.C. 490, 28 S.E. 137 (1897), in which the supreme court ruled for the first time that the duration
of an employment contract is a question of law rather than a factual question of the parties' actual
intentions. The Edwards court held that the parties would have specified a duration had they not
meant for the contract to be terminable at will. Id. at 491, 28 S.E. at 137. The Edwards rule has
survived intact in contract actions. See, e.g., Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971);
Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964); Wilkinson v. Erwin Mills,
Inc., 250 N.C. 370, 108 S.E.2d 673 (1959); Howell v. Commercial Credit Corp., 238 N.C. 442, 78
S.E.2d 146 (1953); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Currier v.
W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 150 N.C. 694, 64 S.E. 763 (1909).
31. Thus, for example, in the'case of Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698
(1976), plaintiff alleged that she left a job she had held for six years to accept employment with
defendant, who had promised her a permanent position. Defendant revoked his promise of em-
ployment and plaintiff brought suit to recover the salary promised her until she located compara-
ble employment. The court relied on the terminable at will rule in holding that plaintiffs
allegations gave rise to no claim upon which relief could be granted because the promise was for
an indefinite period. Id. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 699.
32. 191 N.C. 182, 131 S.E. 633 (1926).
33. 216 N.C. 439, 5 S.E.2d 308 (1939); see Note, 18 N.C.L. REv. 261 (1940).
34. 191 N.C. at 185, 131 S.E. at 634-35; 216 N.C. at 440, 5 S.E.2d at 309-10.
35. Under the facts of the cases, there were no independently actionable torts. See 191 N.C.
at 189, 131 S.E. at 636-37; 216 N.C. at 441-42, 5 S.E.2d at 310. In neither case was it suggested
that violations of public policy or statutory rights would support a tort action for wrongful dis-
charge.
36. See W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971). "Tort actions are created to
protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise
to them are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily
upon the will or intention of the parties [to the contract] .. " Id.
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Elmore and May of inquiring whether there was an independently ac-
tionable tort. Dockery's allegation of retaliatory discharge conceded
the general terminable at will rule but asserted an exception to the rule
based upon defendant's particular motive and the effect of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act in rendering that motive unjustified. Such an
allegation states the elements essential to the general tort action some-
times characterized as prima facie tort.37
The prima facie tort approach recognizes a claim for relief for
damages caused by defendant's intentional and malicious action that is
calculated to harm and is without justification or privilege.38  Though
prima facie tort is a principle of general applicability, it is applied pri-
marily to injuries to economic relations.39 It thus supplements the
strictly categorized nominate torts that protect personal and property
interests, and provides an analytical tool for measuring the interests of
the plaintiff that have been intentionally invaded against the defend-
ant's justification for his or her action.40 A familiar example is the spite
fence. A person has the legal right to erect fences on his or her land as
he or she wishes, but erection of a fence solely to block his or her neigh-
bor's light and air is actionable, even though the neighbor has no com-
mon-law right to light and air.4 Intent to injure and absence of
justification are the key elements, and social policy influences the out-
come.
42
37. This characterization has its genesis in the statement of Justice Holmes that "[ijt has been
considered that, primafacie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action
.... " Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). The law of prima facie tort, so character-
ized, developed primarily in New York. See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967); For-
kosch, An Anaysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465, 475-76
(1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New York - Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
530 (1968).
38. The leading case is Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow., & Co., 23 Q.B. 598 (1889), a/fd,
[1892] A.C. 25, in which Lord Bowen formulated the classic statement of the elements of the tort:
"intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and
which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if done
without cause of excuse." Id. at 613.
39. See generally Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Princo/le,
54 Nw. UNIV. L. REv. 563 (1959); Holmes, Privilege, Malice andIntent, 8 HARV. L. REV. I (1894);
Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1952).
40. See Forkosch, supra note 37; Note, supra note 39, at 505. That a consideration of the
defendant's motive and justification is central to the determination of liability is evident in manytort fields, see, e.g., W. PROSSaR, supra note 36, at 24-26, 26 n.8, despite the misleading but fre-
quently noted adage that malicious motives alone do not make wrongful an act that is in its
essence lawful. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 126 N.C. 100, 101, 35 S.E. 235,
235 (1900).
41. Welsh v. Todd, 260 N.C. 527, 133 S.E.2d 171 (1963); Burris v. Creech, 220 N.C. 302, 17
S.E.2d 123 (1941); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 419, 66 S.E. 439 (1909). See generally I F.
HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS 78 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 36, at 25.
42. See generally Holmes, supra note 39, at 3.
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Although the North Carolina courts have not adopted the prima
facie tort approach by name, the analytical approach is employed in
resolving many tort issues. The North Carolina Supreme Couri has
distinguished actual malice, or ill will, which does not create liability,
from legal malice, or absence of justification for an intentionally caused
injury, which does impart liability.43 This terminology is conclusory in
itself but reflects the court's resolution of conflicting interests when a
defendant has exercised an otherwise legal right in a wrongful manner.
This analytical approach has guided the North Carolina Supreme
Court's reasoning in the tort fields of nuisance,' abuse of process and
malicious prosecution,4" and particularly in the myraid forms of inter-
ference with contractual or other economic relationships.46
The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent treatment of claims of
interference by defendants with contracts of employment between
plaintiffs and third parties provides a good example of this analytical
approach. In the past, the most common defense to claims of interfer-
ence with contracts of employment has been the justification of "legal
right" to terminate the contract at will,47 thus precluding an examina-
tion of defendant's motive.48 In Smith v. Ford Motor Co. ,4 however,
the North Carolina Supreme Court eschewed a formalistic' analysis of
43. Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 675, 84 S.E.2d 176, 182 (1954); Coleman v. Whisnant,
225 N.C. 494, 506, 35 S.E.2d 647, 656 (1945).
44. See cases cited note 41 supra.
45. See Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. REV. 285, 302-04 (1969).
See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 41 at 330 (abuse of process defined as legal
process employed "in a manner technically correct but for a wrongful or malicious purpose to
attain an unjustifiable end or an object which it was not the purpose of the particular process
employed to effect").
46. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Childress v. Abeles,
240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954); Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945);
Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874). The court's analysis in this area has suffered from confu-
sion of tort and contract principles when addressing interference with contractual relationships.
See Note, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1284, 1286 n.17 (1976). See also Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936) (interference with expected legacy).
47. See Note, supra note 46, at 1287-88 n.24.
48. See, eg., Beane v. Weiman Co., 5 N.C. App. 279, 168 S.E.2d 233 (1969); Biggers v. Mat-
thews, 147 N.C. 299, 302 61 S.E. 55, 57 (1908).
49. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); see Note, supra note 46, at 1284; Note, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 901 (1976).
50. Formalistic contract law postulated that the contract itself is the exclusive determinant of
the parties' legal rights and the only measure ofjustice. Formalism superceded earlier conceptions
of "natural" law that gave legal status to ethical duties outside the actual terms of contract. For-
malism in judicial thinking thus forecloses "particularized equitable inquiries into the circum-
stances of individual cases and [destroys] more particular legal rules in the name of promoting the
'rule of law."' M. HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 263 (1977). Seegener-
ally C. FRIEDMMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 18-22 (1965); M. HOROwrrz, supra, at 253-63;
Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH L. REv. 253 (1947).
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contractual relations that would have vindicated defendant and instead
examined defendant's actual motive in inducing plaintiffs employer to
discharge plaintiff. 1 Plaintiff was employed by an auto dealer and al-
leged that defendant auto manufacturer had coerced the dealer into
firing him by threatening to terminate the dealer's franchise agreement
with defendant, which was terminable at will. Although contract anal-
ysis placed an "absolute" right in defendant to terminate the franchise
and in the dealer to terminate plaintiff's employment,52 the court held
that defendant's right was limited to those motives "reasonably related
to the protection of a legitimate business interest."5 Similar cases in
other jurisdictions54 have employed the Smith reasoning in allowing
tort claims by employees whose discharge was induced by their em-
ployer's workers' compensation insurance carrier because of the em-
ployee's pursuit of compensation benefits.5
These cases demonstrate the readiness of courts, including North
Carolina courts, to look beyond contractual rights when prima facie
tort issues of wrongful motive and absence ofjustification are presented
in the employment context. In Dockery, plaintiff alleged that his dis-
charge was motivated solely by an attempt to coerce him into foregoing
his statutory rights to compensation. The wrongful nature of such a
motive is plain. The North Carolina courts in the pre-workers' com-
pensation era recognized that an employer has great influence in deter-
mining the conduct of its employees and may use that influence
wrongfully to their injury.56 In one case an employer's attempt to co-
erce, by means of a threatened discharge, an employee into foregoing a
remedy for a work-related injury was viewed as supporting a ruling of
undue influence that invalidated a release obtained by the employer.5 7
51. 289 N.C. at 88-90, 94, 221 S.E.2d at 293, 296.
52. See id. at 94, 221 S.E.2d at 296.
53. Id. Plaintiff in Smith was manager of a Ford dealership and alleged that Ford procured
his discharge because of his participation in an alliance of Ford dealers who were seeking to
improve their bargaining position with Ford. The court indicated that discharge for this reason
did not further a legitimate business interest. Id. at 87, 221 S.E.2d at 292.
54. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Schottenbauer, 257 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1958); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921); Hilton v. Sheridan Coal Co.,
132 Kan. 525, 297 P. 413 (1931).
55. Although this issue had not been presented in North Carolina prior to Dockery, the mod-
icum of protection against unjustified interference with the employment relationship established
by Smith created the possibility that, after Dockery, a court could require a legitimate businessjustification for discharge by the employer's franchisor or insurance carrier but not for discharge
by the employer himself. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusie Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1424 (1967).
56. King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 N.C. 44, 63, 72 S.E. 801, 808 (1911).
57. Causey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 166 N.C. 5, 10-11, 81 S.E. 917, 918 (1914).
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Workers' compensation does not abrogate this common law censure of
coercive tactics; rather, the goals as well as the terms of the statute are
additional support for the censure. The Dockery court's conclusory re-
sponse to plaintiff's assertion of wrongful motive was that defendant
has a legal right to discharge except when there is a statutorily created
exception. This begs the very question presented-whether this "right"
applies if the discharge arguably contravenes clearly established public
policy. 8 Although the Dockery court stated that it would leave the
"valid" policy issues to the legislature,59 the court in fact made a very
clear policy decision. Those who lost their jobs for pursuing their
rights to compensation and those who chose to forego their rights to
compensation in order to retain their jobs were left without legal re-
course.
In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly responded to the
Dockery decision by amending the Workers' Compensation Act to pro-
hibit the discharge or demotion of any employee because the employee
has filed a workers' compensation claim.60 An employee discharged or
demoted in violation of the new provision is entitled to be reinstated to
58. In similar circumstances some courts have adopted a "public policy exception" to the
terminable at will rule and have held that such contracts may not be terminated for reasons that
contravene clearly expressed public policy. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (wrongful to discharge for refusal
to perjure); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (wrongful to discharge for serving
jury duty); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (,V. Va. 1978) (wrongful to discharge for
attempt to bring employer into compliance with consumer credit laws). But see, Geary v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 452 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (not wrongful to discharge for warning public about
dangers of employer's product, because public policy not clearly established). See generally
Blumrosen, The Right to Seek Workmen's Compensation, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 491 (1961).
Several commentators have suggested that a retaliatory discharge should be actionable even
in the absence of legislative expressions of public policy. E.g., Blades, supra note 55; Note, Work-
men's Compensation-No Private Right ofAction for Retaliatory Discharge in North Carolina, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 139 (1979) (discussing Dockery). The only case fully accepting this posi-
tion is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See Comment, Employ-
ment Contracts Terminable at Wil. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. and Bad Faith Discharges, 63 KY.
L.J. 513 (1975); Note, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 232 (1974). In Monge, plaintiff alleged that
she was discharged for refusing to date her foreman, and the court held that "a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract." 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 55 1.
59. 36 N.C. App. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
60. Ch. 738, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 806 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1979)).
This amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act reads as follows:
97-6.1. Protection of claimants from discharge or demotion by employers.-(a) No
employer may discharge or demote any employee because the employee has instituted or
caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.
(b) Any employer who violates any provision of this section shall be liable in a civil
action for reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation, and
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his or her former position and may bring a civil action for damages
suffered as a result of the violation.61 The provision provides that the
an employee discharged or demoted in violation of this section shall be entitled to be
reinstated to his former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.
(c) Any employer shall have as an affirmative defense to this section the following:
willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work or being disorderly or intoxicated
while at work, or destructive of an employer's property; or for failure to meet employer
work standards not related to the Workers' Compensation Claim; or malingering; or
embezzlement or larceny of employer's property; or for violating specific written com-
pany policy of which the employee has been previously warned and for which the action
is a stated remedy of such violation.
(d) The General Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction of actions under this see-
tion.
(e) The failure of an employer to continue to employ, either in employment or at
the employee's previous level of employment, an employee who receives compensation
for permanent disability, total or partial, shall in no manner be deemed a violation of
this section.
(f) The statute of limitations for actions under this section shall be six months as set
out in G.S. 1-55.
61. This statutory limitation upon the employer's absolute right of discharge has an interest-
ing constitutional background. When the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act was en-
acted in 1929, the employer's right to discharge an employee under a terminable at will contract
was considered protected under the contracts clause of the Constitution, and state interference
with the "right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from the person offering to sell it" had been held by the United States Supreme Court
to be a deprivation of due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 10 (1914) (quoting Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal
legislation similar to the state statute invalidated in Coppage)). There were also numerous state
rulings similarly construing state and federal constitutions. See, e.g., Coffeyville Vitrified Brick &
Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 305, 76 P. 848, 850 (1904); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Griffin, 106 Tex.
477, 489, 171 S.W. 703, 707 (1914). Not until the National Labor Relations Act was upheld in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), was legislative power to limit the
employer's right of discharge acknowledged. See id. at 45-46; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (4) (1976). In
North Carolina, labor statutes adopted prior to Jones & Laughlin neither created civil causes of
action on behalf of an employee injured by a violation nor prohibited discrimination or discharge
by the employer in retaliation for pursuit of statutory rights. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6566
(Michie 1931) (maximum hours per shift for common carrier employees) (repealed and super-
seded by 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 409, (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95.15 to .25
(1975)); id. §§ 5032-33 (Michie 1931) (child labor) (repealed and superseded by 1937 N.C. Sess.
Laws, ch. 317 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110.1 to .20 (1975)); id. § 6554-57 (Michie
1931) (miscellaneous provisions). Instead, such statutes used criminal provisions to regulate the
conditions of employment pursuant to the state's police power. Their interference with the em-
ployment contract was seen as incidental and was distinguished in Coppage from direct interfer-
ence by statutes that proscribed the employer's right of discharge. 236 U.S. at 18. The one North
Carolina labor statute that did provide employees with a cause of action prior to Jones & Laughlin
was the blacklisting statute adopted in 1909, which established criminal and civil penalties for an
employer who, having discharged an employee, then attempted to prevent that employee from
obtaining employment with any other employer. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-355 (1969). The
blacklisting statute was construed in Seward v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 159 N.C. 242, 75 S.E. 34
(1912), as not interfering with the employer's right to discharge with or without cause. Consistent
with Coppage, in Goins v. Sargent, 196 N.C. 478, 146 S.E. 131 (1928), the court stated that "[t]he
purpose of these blacklisting statutes is to protect employees in the enjoyment of their natural
rights and privileges guaranteed them by the Constitution, viz., the right to sell their labor and
acquire property thereby." .1d. at 483, 146 S.E. at 133.
Since Jones & Laughlin, North Carolina has adopted several statutes that limit the employer's
absolute right of discharge, but until the new § 97-6.1, all such provisions had been based upon
prior federal legislation. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-83 (1975), which protects employees
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employee has the burden of proof of a violation and establishes as af-
firmative defenses available to an employer several non-retaliatory mo-
tives for the discharge or demotion.6" The statute of limitations for
such actions is six months. 63
Several issues are raised by the language of the new provision.
First, the range of actions that an injured employee may take in pursuit
of compensation while being protected from discharge is unclear.
While the original version of the amendment protected an employee
who "has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in
a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any pro-
ceeding under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, or
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding," 6 the words
"in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim"
were deleted during legislative hearings. This deletion, however, does
not resolve the question of the precise scope of the protection afforded
by the statute. The scope of protection turns on the meaning of a "pro-
ceeding under the. . .Act"; that is, whether "proceeding" is limited to
formal adversary proceedings before the Industrial Commission or ex-
tends to all actions that under the Act are in furtherance of the injured
employee's pursuit of compensation benefits.
The same issue has arisen under the Texas retaliatory discharge
statute,65 which is the only state statute that has protective language
identical to that in the original version of the North Carolina provision.
In Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas,66 plaintiff sustained an injury on the job
and received medical treatment and wage replacement benefits during
a one-month period of disability. On the day that he returned to work,
plaintiff arrived late, having overslept as a result of taking medication
for pain. He was fired when he arrived.67 In his subsequent action
from discharge or other discrimination in employment due to membership or nonmembership in a
union, was adopted after such antidiscrimination provisions were authorized by § 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976). In addition, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(8) (1975),
protecting employees from retaliation for initating OSHA inspections or proceedings, was adopted
in 1971 after enactment of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1976), which authorizes states to assume enforcement duties, id. § 667, and protects employees
against retaliation for initiating proceedings, id. § 660(c). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-24.15(b)
(Supp. 1979) (provision of the Mine Safety and Health Act), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74-24.1 to .20
(Supp. 1979), which is patterned after § 815(c)(1) of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(b), (c) (1979).
63. Id. § 97-6.1(f).
64. H.B. 568, 1979 N.C. Sess. (introduced March 1, 1979).
65. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1979).
66. 533 S.W.2d 111 (ex Civ. App. 1976) (cert. denied).
67. Id. at 114-15.
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under the retaliatory discharge statute, the court was presented with the
question whether plaintiff had instituted a "proceeding" under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, since he had not filed a formal claim.
The court held that plaintiff had instituted a proceeding because the
Act required the employer to notify the Industrial Commission of the
accident and to provide for necessary medical treatment.
68
The statutory scheme under the North Carolina Act is similar to
that of Texas: injured employees must notify their employers in writing
of an accident within thirty days of its occurrence; 69 employers must
pay for necessary medical treatment for injuries, 70 must keep records of
all work-related injuries and must notify the Industrial Commission of
injuries that cause absence from work for more than one day.71 As in
Texas, these steps "set the wheels of the Workmen's Compensation
Law into motion,"7 although no formal claim has been filed. In most
routine cases injured employees receive compensation benefits for
work-related injuries without filing formal claims with the Industrial
Commission.73 Thus, it would be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme to conclude that no proceeding under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Law was ever initiated, even though the employee had collected
all benefits provided by law, just because the formal claim for compen-
sation was never filed.74 Section 97-6.1, therefore, should protect the
injured employee in taking any action that under the scheme of the
North Carolina Act would ultimately lead to the receipt of statutory
benefits, regardless of whether such action includes the filing of a claim
or results in a formal adversary hearing before the Industrial Commis-
sion.75
An analogy to this broad reading of the statute's protective lan-
guage is found in the United States Supreme Court's construction of
section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act.76 Section 8(a)(4)
68. Id. at 115-16.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-22 (1979).
70. Id. §§ 97-25, -59.
71. Id. § 97-92(a).
72. 533 S.W.2d at 115.
73. Between July 1, 1977 and June 30, 1978, there were 48,215 major industrial injuries re-
ported to the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Of these only 3,050 were contested and
resulted in hearings before a member of the Commission. TWENTY-FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 10, 28 (1979).
74. 533 S.W.2d at 115.
75. This conclusion derives further support from the legislature's rejection of the more re-
strictive term "file a claim" in favor of the broader "institute a proceeding." See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-6.1(a) (1979); H.B. 868, 1979 N.C. SEss. (introduced March 1, 1979).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
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declares it to be an unfair labor practice "to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under [the Act]." 77 This section is the progenitor of the retal-
iatory discharge provisions adopted in many federal and state stat-
utes.78 In NLRB v. Scrivener,7 9 the Supreme Court construed section
8(a)(4) to protect from discharge an employee who gave a written state-
ment to an NLRB official investigating an unfair labor practice charge
filed against the employer but who had not filed the charge or testified
at a formal hearing."0 The Court reasoned that Congress intended in
adopting section 8(a)(4) that all persons with information about unfair
labor practices be free from coercion against reporting such practices to
the NLRB."1 This freedom is essential since the NLRB does not initi-
ate its own proceedings but depends upon information provided by em-
ployees and employers to implement the National Labor Relations
Act. 2 The integrity of the NLRB's activities, therefore, requires a
broad scope of protection from retaliation rather than the inconsistent
and unequal protection that would result from a narrow reading of the
statute.8 3
This reasoning is equally applicable to the retaliatory discharge
provision of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Like the
NLRB, the North Carolina Industrial Commission cannot initiate its
own proceedings to award compensation for work-related injuries.
Furthermore, the need for protection during the informal stages of the
employee's pursuit of benefits is heightened because the workers' com-
77. Id.
78. For state statutes, see note 7 supra. Federal statutes include the following: § 215(a)(3) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976), prohibits discharge or discipline of any
employee who invokes the provisions of F.L.S.A.; § 2000e-3(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
-17 (1976), prohibits discrimination, including discharge, against any employee on the basis of the
employee's opposition to or initiation of proceedings regarding any unfair employment practice;
§ 623(a)(1) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976), prohibits
discrimination, including discharge, on the basis of age; § 1674(a) of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91 (1976), prohibits discharge of an employee whose wages have been
garnished. For the constitutional background of such statutes, see note 61 supra.
79. 405 U.S. 117, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972).
80. Id. at 121-25.
81. Id. at 121-22; see Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967).
82. 405 U.S. at 122; see 29 U.S.C. § 160-61 (1976).
83. Id. at 124. See also Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 722-26 (6th Cir. 1979)
(broad reading of retaliatory discharge provision of Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976)); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (semble,
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1976)); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations
Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975) (semble, Coal Mine
Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1) (1976)); Smith v. Columbus Metropolitan
Hous. Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (semble, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976)).
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pensation system operates to a significant degree without recourse to
formal proceedings.84 To limit the scope of protection to the filing of
formal claims would lead to intolerable results. Employees would re-
main subject to retaliation for such actions as notifying their employers
of their work-related injuries or participating in a fellow employee's
preparation for formal proceedings short of actually testifying.
To be protected under section 97-6.1, the employee's activity in
pursuing workers' compensation benefits must also be in good faith.8
Thus, the employee must be pursuing the right to benefits for an injury
or disease that he or she has some reason to believe is compensable
under the Act. This test looks solely to the employee's honest belief
concerning the legitimacy of the claim; 6 the actual merits of the claim
should not be considered in a retaliatory discharge case.87
Another question to be faced in the application of section 97-6.1 is
a determination of precisely what employer actions are prohibited.
The original version of the provision stated that no employer may "dis-
charge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee" for
engaging in the protected activity of pursuing statutory benefits.88 This
language was changed to prohibit only discharge or demotion.89 The
change is significant because the deleted term "discriminate" has a
broader reach, particularly in encompassing the possible effects of
non-retaliatory policies of the employer that operate to the detriment of
injured employees. An example of such an effect was presented in the
California case of Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board.9" In .Judson, an employee injured on the job and disabled for
84. See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(a) (1979).
86. For a statutory definition of good faith in another context that is consistent with this
conclusion, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-2(b) (1976), which provides: "A thing is done 'in good faith'
within the meaning of this Article when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently
or not." Cf. Wooten v. S.R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N.C. 64, 85 S.E. 140 (1915) (good faith in prayer
for relief in civil complaint is honest purpose and rational relation between prayer and facts al-
leged).
87. Accord, Pettaway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, reh'g denied, 415 F.2d
1376 (5th Cir. 1969). Construing the meaning of the retaliatory discharge provision of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976), the court stated:
There can be no doubt about the purpose of [the provision]. In unmistakable language it
is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his
rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine the truth or
falsity of charges and take independent action.
411 F.2d at 1004-05.
88. H.B. 568, N.C. SEas. 1979.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(a) (1979).
90. 22 Cal. 3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978).
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fifteen months was fired when he returned to work because, under the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, employees lost their com-
pany seniority if absent from work for twelve consecutive months due
to illness or injury.9' In prior instances, however, this contract provi-
sion had been waived by the company and the union to permit the
injured employee to return to work.92 Drawing on the California re-
taliatory discharge statute, which prohibits an employer from discharg-
ing or in any manner discriminating against an employee because of
his or her pursuit of workers' compensation benefits, 93 the court held
that the loss of seniority and resulting layoff penalized the injured em-
ployee in violation of the statute's prohibition of discrimination.94 Al-
though the employee's loss of seniority and layoff were due to the long
period of absence caused by the injury and not to the filing of a claim
or other exercise of statutory rights, the court noted that the statute
broadly prohibits "any manner" of discrimination against injured em-
ployees. 95 The North Carolina provision does not reach such non-re-
taliatory actions; only the retaliatory acts of discharge and demotion
are expressly prohibited. The policy behind the new section, however,
could justifiably be found to extend to other retaliatory actions by em-
ployers. Because the statute condemns retaliation, the term "demote"
could be read to encompass actions such as the withholding of employ-
ment benefits or the adoption or enforcement of rules by the employer
when taken with a retaliatory motive.96
The prohibition against discharge or demotion is further qualified:
"The failure of an employer to continue to employ, either in employ-
ment or at the employee's previous level of employment, an employee
who receives compensation for permanent disability, total or partial,
shall in no manner be deemed a violation" of section 97-6. 1.97 This
limitation was added by the legislature to ensure that an employer is
not obligated to retain employees who are no longer capable of per-
forming their tasks.98 Retaliatory discharge statutes in several states
91. Id. at 662, 586 P.2d at 566, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
92. Id. at 665, 586 P.2d at 567, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
93. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
94. 22 Cal. 3d at 667, 586 P.2d at 569, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
95. Id.
96. An attempt by an employer to force an injured employee to seek benefits under an em-
ployee health plan rather than under the Workers' Compensation Act might be construed as retal-
iatory enforcement of a rule. Cf. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 NLRB No. 135 (Sept. 28,
1979).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(e) (1979).
98. Interview with N.C. Rep. Adams, sponsor of H.B. 568 (Oct. 3, 1979).
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contain provisions that exempt from protection employees who are no
longer able to work because of their injuries.99 In every one of these
states, however, the exemption is expressly limited to employees who
are not capable of working. The new North Carolina provision, on the
other hand, may be read as removing, as a class, all recipients of per-
manent partial benefits'00 from the protection of section 97-6.1, even
though many such employees are capable of continuing to work.' 0'
An award of permanent partial disability benefits is premised on a
finding that the injured employee is capable of continuing to work but
only with a reduced earning capacity. For some types of injuries, the
Act prescribes a particular amount of compensation for the employee's
reduction in earning capacity, regardless of the amount of actual reduc-
tion; for other injuries the prediction is made on an individual basis
after a determination of actual reduction suffered by the injured em-
ployee. 102 Such awards are common: for the loss of a finger, for exam-
ple, a permanent partial disability payment is made in a statutorily
scheduled amount, regardless of whether the employee's earning capac-
ity has actually been reduced. 0 3 To exempt as a class employees who
99. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-32(2) (1976) ("unless the employee is no longer capable
of performing his work as a result of the work injury and the employer has no other available
work which'the employee is capable of performing"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West Supp.
1978) ("provided, if such employee shall cease to be qualified to perform the duties of his employ-
ment he shall not be entitled to such restoration and compensation."); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW
§ 120 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (semble); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 5 (West Supp. 1979) ("Pro-
vided no employer shall be required to rehire or retain any employee who is determined physi-
cally unable to perform his assigned duties."). See also 33 U.S.C. § 948a (1976) ("Provided, That
if such employee shall cease to be qualified to perform the duties of his employment, he shall not
be entitled to such restoration and compensation.").
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (1979).
101. The language of § 97-6.1(e) was adopted for reasons of political expediency and has no
rational justification in policy. Lobbyists for manufacturing interests argued that permitting an
employee who had received permanent partial disability compensation benefits and had been dis-
charged to sue for reinstatement and damages under § 97-6.1 would amount to giving the em-
ployee double compensation for the injury. Interview with Rep. Adams (Oct. 3, 1979). This
argument is specious. If an employee is injured, his or her lost wages during a period of disability
are part of the compensation benefits to which he or she would be entitled. Such lost wages would
not be an element of damages in a retaliatory discharge case because, during the period of disabil-
ity, the employee would not have been working whether or not he or she had been illegally fired,
Only if the employee is capable of working has he or she suffered lost wages by reason of an
unlawful discharge, and the damages recoverable are the wages that the employee would have
earned had he or she been allowed to return to work rather than wage replacement benefits for
having suffered an injury. Thus, there would be no double recovery.
102. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 57.10; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-30, -31 (1979).
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1979). During fiscal year 1977-78, there were 5,179 awards
of permanent partial disability benefits in North Carolina. Though constituting only 11% of the
number of reported major industrial injuries, these claims accounted for over half of all benefits
paid during the year. TWENTY-FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION 28 (1978).
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suffer permanent partial disabilities from the protection of section 97-
6.1 is without rational basis, and the General Assembly should refine
this provision to exempt only injured employees who are not capable of
resuming their employment duties.
The final issue raised by the protective scheme of section 97-6.1 is
the nature of the employee's burden of proof on the issue of causation.
It is clear that the employee must prove that the discharge or demotion
was caused by his or her protected activity. The original version of the
section provided that "[t]he fact that an employee has in good faith
filed a claim. . . and was later discharged or discriminated against by
his employer shall be prima facie a violation of this section.'' In the
enacted version, however, the prima facie violation provision was re-
placed by the statement that "[t]he burden of proof shall be upon the
employee."' 5 No further guidance is offered by the statute as to the
degree of causation that must be proved. A few states, unlike North
Carolina, expressly require proof that the discharge was solely because
of the workers' compensation claim.1" 6 Such an onerous burden of
proof should not be presumed under the North Carolina statute in the
absence of a more explicit provision. It is more likely that a plaintiff
will be required to prove that his or her protected activity was a cause
of the discharge or demotion. In addition, the legislature added a sub-
section enumerating several affirmative defenses available to the em-
ployer: Discharge does not violate the statute if based upon the
employee's willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work, intoxi-
cation, disorderly conduct, destruction or theft of the employer's prop-
erty, failure to meet work standards, or violation of certain written
company policies.' 0 7 Because the employer would have the burden of
proof on these defenses, it is apparent that an employee need not prove
that he or she was not fired for any of the enumerated reasons.
In the ordinary case direct proof of causation will not be available.
Employers aware of the statutory prohibition of retaliatory discharge
will not state that an employee was fired because of the filing of a com-
pensation claim.'0 8 Rather, the employee's case will more often depend
104. H.B. 568, 1979 N.C. Sass. (introduced March 1, 1979).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(b) (1979).
106. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-322 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A(a) (1979).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(c) (1979).
108. One recent case in which such direct proof was available involved a proceeding under the
National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB held that a discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's
compensation claim violates the Act's prohibition against discharging an employee who engages
in concerted activity to improve the terms and conditions of employment. Krispy Kreme Dough-
nut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Sept. 28, 1979) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)).
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upon circumstantial evidence.'0 9 Thus, evidence of the approximity in
time of the protected activity and the discharge and of the employee's
good work record and continuing ability to perform the required tasks
should have substantial probative weight. In addition, evidence of a
pattern of retaliatory behavior"O°  an anti-compensation animus-on
the part of the employer should be very persuasive under section 97-
6.1."'1
The addition of section 97-6.1 to the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act is a welcome response by the General Assembly to
the Dockery decision. Although the new provision is more limited in
scope that those of several other states, especially in its unjustifiable
exemption of recipients of permanent partial disability benefits from its
protection, it does provide the basic protection needed by employees
who pursue their rights to compensation for work-related injuries and
diseases. The North Carolina courts should read the new provision lib-
erally for the benefit of injured employees in keeping with the tradi-
tional judicial approach to the Workers' Compensation Act.' 2
DONNELL VAN NOPPEN, III
109. Such proof has been recognized as clearly sufficient in analogous circumstances. In Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a prima facie
violation of Title VII, the federal provision outlawing discrimination in employment, may be
established by showing that (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected minority; (2) plaintiff applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) plaintiff was rejected;
and (4) after the rejection of plaintiff, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants. Id. at 802.
110. In Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Tex. 1978), plaintiffalleged a conspiracy by his
employer to prevent employees from pursuing their workers' compensation rights in part by mak-
ing an example of anyone who challenged the employer's decision not to pay medical or disability
benefits for an injury. Plaintiffclaimed that he was discharged after suffering a severe back injury
and that his employer asked plaintiff's doctor not to treat plaintiff, urged plaintiffs lawyer not to
represent plaintiff, fired plaintiff's daughter, and persuaded plaintiffs other employer to fire plain-
tiff. Id. at 990.
111. The Dockery court indicated that such evidence might have provided a basis for a claim
for relief even in the absence of the statutory amendment. 36 N.C. App. at 299, 244 S.E.2d at 276,
112. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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